University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications
Spring 1995

Culture Clash: Law and Science in America
Glenn Harlan Reynolds

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Mar 17 12:46:22 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Culture Clash: Law and Science in America, 35 Jurimetrics J.
349 (1995).
ALWD 7th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Culture Clash: Law and Science in America, 35 Jurimetrics J.
349 (1995).
APA 7th ed.
Reynolds, G. (1995). Culture clash: law and science in america. Jurimetrics Journal,
35(3), 349-360.
Chicago 17th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, "Culture Clash: Law and Science in America," Jurimetrics
Journal 35, no. 3 (Spring 1995): 349-360
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, "Culture Clash: Law and Science in America" (1995) 35:3
Jurimetrics J 349.
AGLC 4th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 'Culture Clash: Law and Science in America' (1995) 35(3)
Jurimetrics Journal 349
MLA 9th ed.
Reynolds, Glenn Harlan. "Culture Clash: Law and Science in America." Jurimetrics
Journal, vol. 35, no. 3, Spring 1995, pp. 349-360. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 'Culture Clash: Law and Science in America' (1995) 35
Jurimetrics J 349
Provided by:
University of Tennessee College of Law Joel A. Katz Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

B
O

O

K

R

VIE

W S

CULTURE CLASH:
LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA
Steven Goldberg
New York University Press, 1994
255 pages

Reviewed by
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
BETWEEN PILATE AND GALILEO
In recent years, there has been a great deal of attention given to the
idea that "junk science" has distorted the legal process.' It thus seems only
fair that someone should begin worrying about the effect that law (perhaps
even "junk law") might have on science. Although Steven Goldberg's
Culture Clash: Law and Science in America2 could hardly be called a

response to Peter Huber's Galileo'sRevenge, 3 it represents a similar inquiry
from a vastly different starting point into the respective roles of law and
science in America. Reading it, I was reminded (in no small part by
Goldberg's repeated references) of Stephen Carter's Culture of Disbelief.4

* Glenn Harlan Reynolds is Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee, and
a member of the Advisory Board, Center for Constitutional Issues in Technology. He notes that
his thinking on the subjects covered in this review owes much to Rob Merges and Steve Carter,
and any errors or misconceptions merely reflect the parts where their influence failed to take
hold.
1. PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
2. STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN AMERICA (1994).

3. See HUBER, supra note 1.
4. STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
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Why is it that the past couple of years have seen three major books aimed
at the three pillars of American society-law, science, and religion-each
arguing that "its" pillar has been weakened by interference from the others?
I will discuss Goldberg's book, comment on his analysis of the uneasy
relationship between law, religion, and science, and suggest why these three
pillars of our society seem so at odds. I will offer some suggestions for
improving matters, although I do not believe that anything close to a cure is
likely. I begin with a discussion of Goldberg's main points.
I. THE WORLD ACCORDING TO GOLDBERG
If American society rests on the three pillars of law, science, and
religion, then according to Goldberg they are pillars of distinctly unequal
size. In Goldberg's analysis, science and law occupy distinctly favored
positions in our constitutional and societal scheme, while religion is a distant
third place. Where basic research is concerned, science is favored over
law-it enjoys a "privileged legal status." 5 Science is not above the law, but
scientific decisions receive such enormous deference from the courts as to
amount to "judicial abdication." 6 To make this point, Goldberg compellingly
contrasts the searching review often accorded Social Security disability cases
(which are often very complex and technical) with that acccorded disappointed applicants for scientific research grants. While no lawyer familiar
with the field would characterize Social Security disability law as "applicantfriendly," disappointed applicants for disability benefits receive a number of
opportunities for appeal, and courts are entirely willing to review the
technical judgment of the Social Security Administration in appropriate
cases.7 By contrast, as Goldberg demonstrates, courts are very reluctant to
subject the process of awarding scientific research grants to much review at
all. 8 The result, he says, is that "from a litigator's point of view, basic
science operates in something of a vacuum. . . . The scientific community
itself dominates a system marked by substantial support and freedom for
scientists, whereas the legal community finds itself with little power." 9
One may quibble with this view. Even limited to basic research, it
seems overstated. As a lawyer who frequently deals with scientists, both on
and off campus, I see few working scientists who regard their position as

5. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 62.
6.Id.at 63.
7. Id.At 63-68.
8. Courts have been very reluctant to pierce the veil of confidentiality behind which "peer
review" operates, though that confidentiality has at least the potential for facilitating conflicts
of interest and theft of ideas. See Constance Holden, Court Protects Peer Anonymity, 266
SCIENCE 366 (1994).
9. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 67.
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quite so privileged. Indeed, many feel rather beset by law and lawyers. They
are at pains to make this clear once they learn my profession. My experience
on my University's Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC)
underscores this point. The committee was charged by law with overseeing
and approving all experimentation involving animals. Even handing out
snakes to freshman biology students and telling them "this is a snake"
required continual oversight and a never-ending succession of forms.
Although I hope (and believe) that our committee occasionally did some
good, our main role was to require scientists to fill out more forms, or keep
additional records, to protect the University's legal posterior. Not surprisingly, the scientists generally resented the additional work and the oversight
by a body that included not only other scientists, but also members of the
community and even (horrors!) a lawyer. While the scientists received
grants through a peer-reviewed system largely insulated from judicial review,
their ability to perform the experiments funded by those grants was
substantially constrained by legal norms.
While such regulation is hardly an example of extraordinary deference,
it is true that those who are hostile to scientific experimentation usually have
to attack it indirectly, through claims that it is unsafe or unethical, rather
than through direct attacks on scientific merit. 0 In particular, as Goldberg
convincingly argues, those who have attacked particular pieces of scientific
research on the ground that they are "wrong" or "immoral" have failed
miserably, largely because the entire American constitutional and legal
system was designed to be hostile to such efforts.
Goldberg traces much of our Constitutional philosophy regarding
science and religion to debates in the era of the framing of the Constitution.
When Boston's Reverend Thomas Prince delivered a sermon blaming the
Boston earthquake of 1755 on divine retribution for Benjamin Franklin's
invention of the lightning rod, Prince was immediately attacked by Harvard
professor John Winthrop and other leading intellectual lights. As Goldberg
characterizes the debate:
Winthrop's response, as well as his writings on comets a few years later,
attacked clergy who fostered fear rather than understanding of natural
phenomena, and emphasized the consistency of Winthrop's own belief in
God with an understanding of Newtonian mechanics. Winthrop's attitude
exemplified an important strand of Enlightenment thinking: a combination
of attacks on "superstitious" clergy with support for scientific specula-

10. Indeed, it is not entirely unfair to suggest that much of the "animal rights"

movement, at least that part of it directed at scientific research involving animals, has as much
to do with hostility toward scientific research as it does with concern for animal welfare. For
more on this topic, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Uneasy Case for Animal Rights
(forthcoming).
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tion. Leading American scientists joined Winthrop in condemning the
"priestcraft" that controlled men's minds. The goal of these scientists was
not atheism, but rather a faith illuminated by natural philosophy. 1'
Since the Framers shared these attitudes, 2 it is not surprising that the new
nation was founded on principles friendly to scientific inquiry. Indeed, the
establishment of the American Republic can be viewed as Galileo's true
revenge (notwithstanding Huber) against the clergy who suppressed his ideas.
In such an environment, efforts at stamping out the teaching of
scientific theories such as evolution were doomed to fail, as they did. 3
Where religion collides science, the playing field is not level:
[Blasic science occupies a favorable position indeed in American law and
culture. The Constitution shields science from its rival-religion-and
from government suppression. It lays the groundwork for generous
funding, and statutes assure that the resulting funding is parceled out by
the scientific community itself. Meanwhile in our pluralistic culture with
traditional religious voices often weak and divided, science even plays a
major role in the formation of our values. Throughout the entire process,
the progressive ethos of science utterly dominates the cautious process
norms of the lawyer. 4
At least where basic research is concerned, scientists have a rather good
deal, though not quite as good as Goldberg maintains. But things change
drastically once we leave the pristine intellectual uplands of basic research
and enter the marshy lowlands of technology. There, "the tables are turned
with a vengeance.""' Congress has the authority to impose conditions on its
grants for scientific research, and it has the power to regulate science under
a variety of environmental, safety, national security, and public policy
rationales. Furthermore, Congress has delegated much of its authority to
administrative agencies that are likely to be less accountable and more
intrusive than Congress itself.' 6
Nor do scientists receive deferential treatment from the courts where
such regulations are involved. The result is a very different world from that
in which basic research reigns supreme. As Goldberg says, "When the issues
become those of accommodating the interests of competing public groups
rather than determining the will of the scientific community, attorneys begin
to come to the fore. . . .Lawyers have this role because, as we have seen,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 71 (citations omitted).
Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72-79.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 88-89.
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they are the principle [sic] agents for the peaceful resolution of social
disputes in American society, and agencies are a microcosm of that society."
Most questions involving applied technology involve value judgments.
Should we accept lung disease and deaths from lung problems brought about
by burning coal, instead of a risk of radiation accidents from nuclear power?
The methodologies of science do not provide answers. Science is concerned
with consensus and truth. With such questions, consensus is unlikely because
it is hard to say what constitutes a "true" answer to a question based on
values. Galileo's famous post-trial statement, "nonetheless, it still moves,"
stresses truth over process. Pilate's question, "what is truth?" expresses a
litigator's response to such concerns. Lawyers are used to such questions,
and the methodologies of the law are designed to deal with them. But judges
and lawyers are not always comfortable with the uncertainties in the state of
scientific information, 7 and rapid scientific progress produces a persistent
"regulatory gap." This regulatory gap, Goldberg says, creates a need for
more coordination between the areas of basic research on the one hand and
applied research and regulation on the other.
As a response to this gap, the scientific community, Goldberg says, has
created "science counselors" who serve as bridges between the scientific and
the nonscientific communities. These scientists import social considerations
earlier into the process, by infusing basic research with a concern for
consequences and applications. This may sound good, and within limits
Goldberg thinks that it is, but he is not entirely happy. Although the
counselors' purpose is to reduce conflict between research and regulation,
Goldberg fears that they may unintentionally pollute the pristine world of
basic science. Like a St. Laurence Seaway of the intellect, they may lead to
the infestation of the pure waters of research with the mental lampreys and
zebra mussels of unscientific lawyerly thinking. Goldberg fears a future in
which science counselors enjoy too much influence:
In such a world, the ethic of socially acceptable progress would permeate
all research. In other words, basic research would no longer represent
one of two cultures-law and science-vying for dominance in our
society. No longer would science embody a belief in the progressive
growth of knowledge that stands in sharp contrast to the law's processoriented belief in the peaceful resolution of social disputes. The science
counselor would represent one culture in which progress and process
have merged into an ethic of social progress.
There are gains in this scenario-the regulatory gap would be
narrowed in the short run, meaning that appropriate technology would be

17. See generally CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND
MEETING CHALLENGES (1993).
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available more efficiently. But there are costs as well, because a complete
triumph of the science counselor would not be consistent with productive
science in the long run. . . . The science counselor seeks to avoid
wasteful regulation by bringing science in line with reasonable social
goals. In doing so, however, those who would save science, threaten it.
The danger is that science will be loved to death, smothered in the
8
embrace of social considerations.'
Goldberg concludes with an uncharacteristically lukewarm observation that
some science-counselling is good, but that too much would be bad. "9 Surely,
there is more to be said about the issue. And, in fact, there is.

II. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN
If scientists have tried to adjust to the demands of law, regulation, and
politics with science counselors who inject social concerns into their
processes early on, lawyers have done the same kind of thing in reverse. The
interface between law and regulation on the one hand, and science and
technology on the other, has inspired scientists and lawyers to become
involved in bridge-building. Indeed, to our good fortune, Steve Goldberg is
one of those mediators.
A science counselor must learn something about law and politics-not
necessarily so much that he or she becomes a lawyer or a politician (though
this happens)-but enough to understand the legal and political ramifications
of scientific developments and to communicate the important aspects to other
scientists. Likewise, a burgeoning law and technology movement has
produced a new breed of lawyers who understand something about the world
of science and technology-not enough, perhaps, to do science, 20 but enough
to understand the way law impacts science and technology, and vice versa.
Such figures and the many journals now devoted to the field can work to
close the law's own version of the "regulatory gap." Legal institutions, by
nature conservative, do not always adapt well to rapid technological change.
Goldberg gives a good example in a discussion of legal protection of
software. 2 ' This "teaching old law new tricks" problen 2 can be mitigated

18. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 182-83.
19. "So, in the end, our imperfect reality can only be improved in imperfect ways. A
heavier dose of social concern is coming into the scientific world, and, if that dose remains a
limited part of the research endeavor, it can perform a valuable service in narrowing the
regulatory gap. There are no exact standards available here, but a clear understanding of law
and science in American life makes steps in the right direction more likely." Id. at 183-84.
20. There have been a few eminent lawyer-scientists-Edwin Hubble, for example-but
not many.
21. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 99-103.
22. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Robert Patrick Merges, Teaching Old Law New Tricks
(unpublished manuscript, 1982).
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when individuals who understand scientific and technological progress
anticipate its legal implications. A hallmark of the law, science, and
technology movement, such advance thought has done much to ease the
transition of such developments as space law, 23 genetic engineering,2 4 and
nanotechnology' into mainstream legal thought 6
In addition to addressing this closer-to-home version of the regulatory
gap, law, science, and technology types might serve a sort of translation
function. I do not mean teaching lawyers about science, to borrow a phrase
from Harold Green." Rather, I mean helping non-scientists understand the
impact of legal thinking and legal rules on scientists and helping scientists
deal with law and regulation. Thus, while a science counselor might urge
scientists to think about the social consequences of their work (and perhaps
even to modify that work),28 the legal counterpart might stress to the legal
community the adverse consequences of restrictions on research, or the
damaging effect on the norms of the scientific community that may result
from the importation of legal procedures and rules into scientific misconduct
cases. In this process, science counselors and law, science, and technology
lawyers may serve complementary functions. It is often the case that those
who dwell along a border have more in common with the folks across the
border than with their compatriots in the heartland.29

23. Even before the first launch of a spacecraft, legal thinkers were addressing the
questions raised by space travel, and the most important space law agreements, such as the 1967
Outer Space Treaty, were arrived at behind an almost Rawlsian veil of ignorance. John C.
Cooper, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, 4 INT'L L.Q. 4 (1951); WALTER
McDOUGALL, ... THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE AGE 17794 (1985) (surveying the history of early space law).
24. Just as "genetic engineering" was becoming possible, at least in a rudimentary sense,
the scientists involved gathered at Asilomar to discuss the ethical and regulatory issues involved.
See Paul Berg, et al., Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 SCIENCE 99194 (1975).
25. See generally Frederick Fiedler & Glenn Reynolds, Legal Problems of
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593 (1994) (forthcoming).
26. See generally Robert P. Merges, The Nature and Necessity of Law and Science, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 315 (1990) (arguing that this is an important role of the law and science field).
For a particularly well-expressed argument for such advanced thinking, see Joshua Rosenkranz,
A Ghost of Christmtas Yet to Come: Standing to Sue for Future Generations, 1 J.L. & TECH. 67
(1986).
27. Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Decisionmaking, 51
OHIO STATE L.J. 375, 375 (1990).
28. The most prominent example is the Asilomar conference on "recombinant DNA"
research. See supra note 24.
29. Although it is unfair to criticize an author for writing a different book than the
reviewer wishes, I wish that Goldberg had talked more about the legal counterparts of science
counselors. For now, however, we will simply have to hope that he (or someone else) will
address this issue in the future.
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III. WHY ALL THE FUSS?
At the outset, I promised to offer some thoughts on why there has been
so much more dissension lately among law, religion, and science. It is
tempting (and perhaps not wholly inaccurate) simply to locate blame in the
kind of post-Cold War internecine-struggle zeitgeist that characterizes the
conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and various splinters of the former Soviet
Union. Many alliances formed by the need to stand shoulder-to-shoulder
against a feared enemy are now dissolving, and the post-World War II
alliances between science, religion, and law could plausibly fall among their
number. Moreover, it is possible to argue that the current falling out among
science, religion, and law is in keeping with the principles of our nation. The
Framers of our Constitution were deeply concerned about the concentration
of power in too few hands. They created a government that was divided two
ways: between the states and the federal government via federalism, and
within the federal government via separation of powers. The theory was that
rival power centers would police each other and keep any one or two from
growing too strong .'

In the post-World War II era, for a variety of reasons, law and science
reached a comfortable accommodation; religion (as Goldberg notes) was far
less favored. This relationship led to (and was reinforced by) the
"trivialization" of religion that Stephen Carter complains about.31 The
comfortable accommodation between science and law is breaking down, and
religion appears to be gaining more influence. This may be discomfiting to
those (including myself) who generally side with science in the science
versus religion wars, but it may be a helpful corrective. Certainly the lawscience alliance has led to some abuses that went unpoliced.32 Similarly, the
efforts of Peter Huber to criticize "junk science" represent a different kind
of breakdown in the mutual accommodation between law and science, with
lawyers becoming more skeptical of claims based on scientific expertise.
Mutual watchfulness among these three pillars of American society may be
a good thing. Perhaps what appears to be a shift toward mutual hostility is
the return of a more balanced approach.
I think, however, that this view is too optimistic. The key lies in
Goldberg's identification of science as "virtually the last bastion of the

30. See generally Federalist No. 46 (Madison); Federalist No. 48 (Madison); Federalist
No. 51 (Madison) in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1991).
31. See CARTER, supra note 4.
32. Most abuses occurred in the name of Cold War national security. One example is the
recently discovered secret government program that involved injections of plutonium into
hospital patients to study its toxic effects. See U.S. Promises to Release Data on Plutonium Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at 30 col. 1.

356

35 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL

Book Review
optimistic, progressive part of the American ethos." 33 An optimistic belief
in progress underlay the creation of the American republic. ' Only a people
who did not see life as a zero-sum game could have created a nation that
endowed its citizens with equal rights under the law.
For a variety of reasons, none of them particularly good, this belief in
progress has been undermined almost everywhere else but science. By most
objective measures, this nation is richer, freer and more secure than at any
time in its history. Yet, one is hard pressed to find many who believe it, or
who expect further improvement. Outside the field of science (and particularly among non-science academics) a belief in progress has come to be seen
as naivete. Only suckers think that things are going to get better.
This view has been around for a while, but it seems to have gained
favor lately. As an undergraduate, I particpated in a seminar on the future
of humanity. We read gloomy articles predicting resource shortages and
overpopulation. One promised food riots in America by 1980. When I
suggested that technology might solve many of the problems, I was told that
such an approach was an unrealistic effort to avoid wrestling with the
problems. It seemed to me that an assumption of technological stagnation
was far more unrealistic than the assumption (freely made in the same class)
that human nature could be drastically changed in the next few decades. The
track record of scientific and technological progress in this century has been
far better than anyone could have imagined a hundred years ago. The record
of efforts to change human nature over the same period has been one of
equally unimaginable disaster.
That may be the real reason for the "clash of cultures" that Goldberg,
Carter, and Huber describe. Although science itself is partly an exercise in
faith, 5 it differs from religious faith. As Isaac Asimov put it, the chief
distinguishing characteristic of the "religion" of science is that it works.36 In
this century other institutions have frequently failed and produced an array
of wars and genocides so vast that the mind recoils. Religion did not stop the
Holocaust, Stalin and Mao's colossal massacres, World War II, or ethnic
strife in Rwanda or Yugoslavia. Neither did law. With too few exceptions,
representatives of law and religion were distinguished by their cowardice,
denial, and hypocrisy in the face of these catastrophes. Nor, as professors
Cottrol and Diamond remind us, has subsequent scholarship really engaged

33. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 180.
34. Id. at 69-72.
35. Some "postmodern" critics of science have treated it as just another religion, See
generally PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND

ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994) (surveying and criticizing "postmodern" and "social
constructionist" critiques of science).
36. ISAAC ASIMOv, FOUNDATION 112 (1966) ("[I]t is the chief characteristic of the
religion of science, that it works.").

SPRING 1995

Reynolds
this issue.37 Meanwhile science, though not without sin, has continued to
deliver steady increases in our knowledge of, and ability to control, the
world around us.
As all professors know, the outstanding student is likely to face
"levelling" behavior by his or her less-successful fellows. Likewise, much
hostility to science, particularly within the academy, probably stems from the
fact that science in this century has done much better than its competitors.
This has been dealt with in two ways: a pathetic attempt to imitate science
in nonscientific disciplines (what a colleague of mine calls "physics envy"),
or an estrangement from, and even disdain for, the world of science. Both
responses are inappropriate. One cannot transplant the methodology of
science into literary criticism, or even law, wholesale and expect to have
anything viable. 3" But one can hardly ignore the most significant source of
change in modem society and expect to have much to say either.
Lawyers and religious figures of the eighteenth century seemed quite
capable of understanding the world of science and integrating it with their
own, and scientists of the time seemed able to combine scientific and
religious insights. If law and religion are to be checks on and critics of the
world of science, then members of those fields must be able to do the same
today.
In this sense, the work of Goldberg, Carter, and Huber is a hopeful
sign. All are non-scientists who have combined an understanding of scientific
matters with their own disciplines. It is my hope that we will see more like
them in the future. I think that the law, science, and technology movement
has an important role to play in fostering such work. Legal academia tends

37. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J.
995 (1995). Cottrol and Diamond quote Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John
Shattuck to the effect that "In the twentieth century the number of people killed by their own
governments under authoritarian regines is four times the number killed in all this century's wars
combined." They thus argue that
We have, in the twentieth century, seen the rise of monstrous states capable of
deprivations of liberty far in excess of anything that the English Whigs who
authored the Declaration of Rights of 1689-or their American successors in
1791-could have envisioned. . . . That, in the light of history of the twentieth
century, those we rely on for serious constitutional and political commentary have
failed to examine the issues of whether the state should have a monopoly of force
and whether an armed population might still play an important role in deterring
governmental excesses bespeaks a dangerous intellectual cowardice, a self-imposed
limit on political and constitutional discourse that causes us largely to ignore one
of the most criticual questions of our time.
Id. at 1025-26.
38. Of course, there are some things that we can learn. I do not mean to discourage
cross-pollination, but I do condemn cargo-cult like efforts to give non-science the appearance
of science.
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not to value law, science, and technology scholarship as highly as many
other kinds of work that are less useful, but more chic.
I especially hope that we will see more work along these lines from
Steven Goldberg. Culture Clash is an excellent book, one that will benefit
anyone interested in the relationship between law and science in today's
society. But it feels more like the first volume in a series than a completed
work. I hope that Goldberg will continue to analyze these issues from other
angles. In an age when most dramatic social changes are driven by science
and technology, it is important that we lawyers, whom Goldberg correctly
describes as the principal agents for the peaceful resolution of social
disputes, think about the relationship between science, technology, and the
law. Our thinking is better because of Goldberg's work.
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